January 18, 2005

Revolution theory

Filed under: Uncategorized — @ 6:30 pm

News of the death of Mr. Zhao Zi Yang, the former General Secretary of Chinese Communist Party, spread over the Internet. He was famous because he was forced to step down after Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. I have no intention to discuss causes and consequences of that event, neither do I have any judgments on it. However, some theoretical analyses in terms of revolution do deserve some attentions. What I mean by “revolution” here is not judgmental, as a revolution can be anything.

Frustration theory is one of many theories which can partially explain the rise of revolution. It suggests that the confliction between the government (and associated dominators) and those dominated will get tenser over time, thus provoking a revolution. For example, in the Marxism, a revolution is caused by the confliction between working class and capitalists. However, this was not the case for the revolution at the beginning of 1900s in China, neither was the case for the 1989 event. To see this, before 1989, the great confliction was between those rich and those poor due to increasing income inequality. But it was the students who first stood up. The target of its fight was the corruption of the government.

One may notice that during the 1980s, the fast economical growth benefited the whole population. People were enjoying an open political atmosphere which one could not imagine 10 years ago. If life was getting better, why was there a revolution? Mr. Deng Xiao Ping didn’t foresee this during 1980s, even after the earlier sign of revolution such as 1986 UTSC event. One theory suggests that it is not the actual worsening condition but the widening gap of expectation and reality that provokes a revolution. The better condition you have, the higher expectation you may ask for. Furthermore, even though people are getting richer and more freedom, this friendliness of the political atmosphere acts like an invitation for those dissenters to fight. It encourages them to seize this opportunity to overthrow the government. In this sense, the Marxism revolution theory is plainly wrong.

Now here is another piece to consider. To succeed a revolution, one key element is to question the legitimacy of a government. Who can question the legitimacy of the government and who wants to question it? Obviously those know the government well. The reasonable candidates are intellectual groups.

Furthermore, those who want a revolution are those who can benefit from it. They are power hunters. This is the basic idea of power theory. The hunters’ interests are different from those of general population. They need the general population because they need followers and enough people to fight against government. This theory may sound astonishing at first, as Mr. Mao Ze Dong had claimed that “revolutionists can’t part with the general population just as the fish can not live without water.” Think carefully, this says that revolutionists need the general population to work for their purpose. It doesn’t take consideration of general population’s interests. History already told us, every successful revolution finally fell into the hand of intellectuals. In other words, the intellectuals were the leaders of revolution, not the general population.

Now looking at the later 1980s in China, it is clear that the intellectual groups deeply involved in planning this event. However, there was no one good enough and ambitious enough to lead the revolution. From the very beginning, it would fail. During the events, it constantly changed their focus; it never seriously questioned the legitimacy of the government except at the later stage. They lacked intellectual support from the majority of intellectual society. Furthermore, nobody knew what kind of benefits would be from the success of the revolution. Although they did motivate part of the general population, the lay men were of no use. To some extent, the general population were just free-riders. The post-event ruthlessness of the general population further testified this conclusion.

Retrospectively, is that event preventable? I don’t think so. With an open political atmosphere and peer pressure from eastern European countries, facilitated by the western society, the event would come without the death of Mr. Hu Yao Bang. Indeed, even before Hu’s death, people already gathered to plan something during the congress meeting.

Mr. Deng summarized nicely after the event: “the biggest mistake in 10 years renovation is the neglect of ideology.” With a tight control of intellectuals these days, the society is still stable despite the existence of much greater income inequality than before.

Chairman Mao was indeed wiser than Mr. Deng.

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